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There is a well-established literature on the interplay between globalization and human
capital formation. While previous studies have focused on the nexus between education
and trade liberalization1, the role of skill formation in the process of labor market in-
tegration has received less attention.2 This is surprising for two reasons: ﬁrst, there is
persuasive empirical evidence on the increasing importance of international labor mobility
(see Docquier and Marfouk, 2006) and, second, labor market integration clearly exhibits
an eﬀect on expected wage rates and thus on education incentives.
This note sheds light on the consequences of labor market integration for per capita
income and welfare of the left-behind source country population. It also determines the
distributional consequences within this group. To highlight the role of endogenous educa-
tion choices, we model emigration as the outcome of a lottery with the same probability of
emigration for all skill groups.3 In this case, and if skills are exogenous, GDP per capita
and welfare of the left-behind do not depend on the emigration rate. However, if changes
in the emigration probability lead to adjustments in the skill composition, both GDP per
capita and welfare of the left-behind must fall. The reason is that labor market integration
dissociates ex ante education incentives of potential emigrants and the ex post skill inten-
sity which would be optimal for non-migrants. This is a fairly general result that does
not hinge on speciﬁc assumptions on the production technology or on the distribution of
innate ability in the population.
In the next section, we set up our theoretical framework. The results are derived in
1See Findlay and Kierzkowski (1983) for an early contribution, and Janeba (2003) for more recent work.
2Recent theoretical work on the brain drain is an exception (see Stark et al. 1998, and Beine et al.,
2007, and the references therein).
3Docquier and Marfouk (2006) estimate rates of emigration into OECD countries by skill group. On
average, educated workers are more mobile. However, the degree of heterogeneity is high: In the two largest
source countries, Mexico and Turkey, emigration rates do not depend on skills. In addition emigration
rates for low-skilled workers may be substantially underestimated, as the data ignores low-skilled illegal
immigrants). In a supplement, which is attached to this working paper, we account for the case of brain
drain where only high-skilled workers may emigrate. It turns out that our main results do not depend on
the assumption of identical emigration probabilities across skill groups.
2Section 3. Section 4 brieﬂy discusses the robustness of our ﬁndings.
2 Model setup
We consider a small one-sector economy, ‘South’. The representative ﬁrm employs high-
skilled (H) and low-skilled labor (L) to manufacture a homogeneous good Y , according to a
linear-homogeneous production function, which we write in intensive form as Y = Lf(h),
where h ≡ H/L. f(·) has the usual properties f0(·) > 0 and f00(·) < 0 and satisﬁes
the Inada conditions. All markets are perfectly competitive and workers are paid their
marginal products.
The population size in the small economy is normalised to one. The local supply of
high-skilled and low-skilled labor is endogenous and depends on two things: the education
decision of individuals and the emigration rate of high-skilled and low-skilled workers.
Individuals diﬀer with respect to their innate learning ability a ∈ [0,1] which is distributed
according to some c.d.f. G(a), with G0(a) > 0. Educated agents supply a eﬃciency units
of high-skilled labor H, while uneducated ones supply one unit of low-skilled labor L.
Hence, 1 − a describes the private cost of education in terms of lower working time. Risk
neutral agents maximize expected income by choosing whether or not to get educated.
The expected income depends on learning abilities, wages and the propensity to emigrate
for the two skill types. Throughout our analysis, we focus on the empirically relevant case
and assume that Southern total factor productivity (TFP) is so low that both skill types
beneﬁt from emigration to the large, rich ‘North’, whose wages are exogenous from the
Southern perspective. Following Stark et al. (1998), Beine et al. (2001, 2007), emigration
is modeled as a lottery outcome. All individuals face the same probability of successful
emigration, p ∈ (0,1).
Using subscripts to denote skill classes and an asterisk for Northern magnitudes,
expected wages per eﬃciency unit are given by we
H = pw∗
H + (1 − p)wH and we
L =
pw∗
L + (1 − p)wL. The marginal individual ¯ a, that is indiﬀerent between education and
non-education, is determined by the condition ¯ a = 1/ωe, where ωe ≡ we
H/we
L is the
expected skill premium. One can rewrite that condition in terms of within-country wage
3inequality measures ω ≡ wH/wL and ω∗ ≡ w∗
H/w∗






1 − p + pq
(1 − p)ω + pω∗q
. (1)
The supply of low-skilled and high-skilled (non-emigrated) labor is given by Ls = (1 −
p)G(¯ a), and Hs = (1−p)
R 1
¯ a adG(a), respectively. Labor market clearing implies that the






where lim¯ a→0+ h(¯ a) = ∞,lim¯ a→1− h(¯ a) = 0, and dh(¯ a)/d¯ a < 0. Clearly, without a skill-
bias in the emigration probability, any shock that improves the incentives for education
results in higher h.








f (h(¯ a)) − h(¯ a)f0 (h(¯ a))
(3)
where the ﬁrst expression implies a positive relationship between ω and ¯ a. The equilibrium
cut-oﬀ ability, skill intensity, and wage inequality are jointly determined by equations (1)-
(3). Figure 1 illustrates the equilibrium in 1/ωe,¯ a-space. The upward-sloping 45-degree
line depicts the left-hand-side of (1). Substituting (2) into (3) and using the resulting
expression in (1), the right-hand-side of (1) gives a function Ω(¯ a) > 0 with Ω0 (¯ a) < 0 and
lim¯ a→0 Ω(¯ a) = ∞. Hence, there exists a unique equilibrium, with the equilibrium cutoﬀ
ability level being denoted by ¯ ap to indicate the dependence of the cutoﬀ level on the
prevailing emigration rate, p.
From Figure 1, we can also read oﬀ the comparative-static eﬀects of a change in p
on ¯ ap. Noting ∂Ω(·)/∂p >,=,< 0 if ω >,=,< ω∗ and Ω0(·) < 0 (from above), it follows
from the implicit function theorem that an increase in p shifts, for a given ωe, the Ω-
locus in ﬁgure 1 to the right (to the left) if ω > ω∗ (ω < ω∗), leading to a higher (lower)
cutoﬀ ability level ¯ ap.4 Hence, the incentive eﬀect of the emigration lottery depends on a
4In the borderline case of ω = ω
∗, the position of the Ω-locus remains unaﬀected and ¯ ap becomes
independent of p.
4Figure 1: Determination of equilibrium and comparative statics if ω > ω∗.
comparison of within-country wage inequality measures. Recent empirical evidence shows
that the Theil coeﬃcient of wage inequality is 0.07 in the 119 poorest countries while it
is 0.03 in the richest 25 (Galbraith and Lu, 2001).5 This indicates that wage inequality is
substantially larger in poor source countries of emigration relative to rich (mainly OECD)
destination countries. Hence, in the empirically relevant case, we can expect a higher
probability of successful emigration to have a positive impact on ¯ ap and thus a negative
impact on the incentives for education.6 However, our main welfare results do not require
any assumption on the relation between ω and ω∗.
3 Welfare and distribution eﬀects of an emigration lottery
For the welfare analysis, we look at Southern non-migrants and use changes of their total
income as the relevant welfare criterion. Total income of this group is given by (1 −
p)y(¯ ap) = (1−p)G(¯ ap)f(h(¯ ap)), where y(¯ ap) denotes GDP per capita and (1−p)G(¯ ap) =
5Similar comparisons hold for overall inequality, see Deininger and Squire (1996).
6This outcome diﬀers substantially from the ﬁndings in the brain drain literature, where the additional
education incentives from an increase in the emigration probability has been put forward as a source for a
brain gain in the presence of a brain drain (see Stark et al., 1998; Beine et al., 2001).
5(1 − p)LS is domestic low-skilled labor supply in equilibrium. The impact of a change in
the emigration probability from (p1 to p2) on income of the left-behind population can
then be written as V (p1,p2) = (1−p2)[y(¯ ap2)−y(¯ ap1)].7 This implies that we can focus on
the eﬀect of a change in p on GDP per capita, y(¯ ap), in order to determine the respective
welfare eﬀects for non-migrants. Then, the following result is immediate.
Proposition 1. An increase in the emigration probability p leaves GDP per capita and
total income of non-migrants unaﬀected if cutoﬀ ability level ¯ ap and thus the relative skill
supply h(¯ ap) are constant. If the increase in p leads to an adjustment of ¯ ap and thus h(¯ ap),
then both GDP per capita and total income of non-migrants must decline (V (p1,p2) < 0).
Proof. We can write dy(¯ ap)/dp = [dy(¯ ap)/d¯ ap]×[d¯ ap/dp], where dy (¯ ap)/d¯ ap = G0 (¯ ap)f (h(¯ ap))+
G(¯ ap)f0 (h(¯ ap))h0 (¯ ap). Substituting h0(¯ ap) × [G(¯ ap)/h(¯ ap)] = −G0 (¯ a)[1 + ¯ ap/h(¯ ap)],
according to (2), implies
dy (¯ ap)
d¯ ap
= G0 (¯ ap)








Using (3) and (1), we obtain
dy (¯ ap)
d¯ ap
= G0 (¯ ap)f0(·)

pq
ω [(1 − p)ω + pω∗q]

(ω∗ − ω).
Noting from Section 2 that d¯ ap/dp >,=,< 0 if ω >,=,< ω∗, we can conclude that
dy(¯ ap)/dp < 0 if ω 6= ω∗ and dy(¯ ap)/dp = 0 if ω = ω∗. Substituting this result in V
completes the proof of Proposition 1.
Labor market integration implies that the incentives for education in the South become in-
creasingly dependent on Northern relative factor prices. However, only local technological
conditions are relevant for maximizing GDP per capita (and thus overall income of South-
ern non-migrants). An increase in p widens the gap between incentives and the optimal
relative Southern skill intensity, as long as the factor price diﬀerential in the North and the
7The income of the ex post non-migrants prior to the change in p is given by (1 − p1)y(¯ ap1) − (p2 −
p1)y(¯ ap1), where (p2 − p1)y(¯ ap1) denotes the income of ex post migrants prior to the change in p. Rear-
ranging terms, the income of the ex post non-migrants prior to the change in p can then be written as
(1 − p2)y(¯ ap1), while the respective income of this group is given by (1 − p2)y(¯ ap2) after the change in p.
6South do not coincide (i.e., ω∗ 6= ω). If the incentives for education do not change, i.e. if ¯ a
is constant, the relative skill supply remains remains unaﬀected and so do GDP per capita
and total income of the left-behind population. Hence, the negative welfare consequences
of labor market integration do not arise in a model with exogenous skill supply, where the
skill intensity of production remains unaﬀected if the emigration probability increases in
a skill-neutral way.
Beyond the welfare consequences of emigration within non-migrants, we can also de-
termine the distributional eﬀects in the Southern economy. While the analysis in Section
2 suggests a trivial link between ω and p, education decisions also aﬀect the number of
eﬃciency units provided by the average high-skilled worker, so that distribution is also
aﬀected by a compositional factor. Denote the ratio of average high-skilled and low-skilled
factor income by
R(¯ ap) ≡ ωρ(¯ ap), where ρ(¯ ap) =
R 1
¯ ap adG(a)
1 − G(¯ ap)
, (4)
corrects ω for the time costs of education. Then, the following Proposition can be derived.
Proposition 2. An increase in migration probability p raises (reduces) the factor income
ratio R(¯ ap), if wage inequality in the South is higher (lower) than wage inequality in the
North, i.e. if ω > (<)ω∗.
Proof. We can use h0(¯ ap) < 0, according to (2), and dω/dh < 0, according to (3). This




¯ ap(a − ¯ ap)dG(a)
i.
[1−
G(¯ ap)]2 > 0. Putting together, we obtain dR(¯ ap)/d¯ ap > 0. Noting ﬁnally d¯ ap/dp >,=,< 0
if ω >,=,< ω∗ from the analysis in Section 2, completes the proof of Proposition 2.
According to Proposition 2, the distributional consequences of emigration depend on
whether wage inequality in the South is more or less pronounced than wage inequality
in the North. Emigration into an egalitarian economy raises both wage inequality ω and
average high-skilled relative to average low-skilled factor income R(¯ ap) in the South. The
opposite holds true for emigration into a non-egalitarian country (with ω∗ > ω). As
empirical stylized facts indicate that wage inequality in the South is higher than wage
7inequality in the North, we can conclude that (skill-neutral) emigration not only lowers
overall income of the left-behind but it also raises inequality by increasing R(¯ ap).
4 Robustness and concluding remarks
Before concluding, we consider two simple extensions to check the robustness of our results.
First, in virtually all countries some part of education is provided by the public sector.
Denote by D the ﬁxed amount of public education spending, which is ﬁnanced by a
proportional tax τ ∈ (0,1) on local wage income. With respect to the education technology,
we abstract from rivalry and let an educated worker with ability a supply aD eﬃciency
units of high-skilled labor. The government budget constraint is
D = τ(1 − p)G(¯ ap)f (h(¯ ap)). (5)
Proposition 1 states that, if ω 6= ω∗, emigration lowers GDP per capita, y(¯ ap) = G(¯ ap)f(h(¯ ap)).
Hence, with D constant, equation (5) implies that the tax burden for non-migrants in-
creases. All other things equal, this reinforces the negative eﬀects of a migration lottery
on the group of non-migrants.8
Second, there may be a positive externality of a better educated workforce. To account
for this channel of inﬂuence let total factor productivity (TFP; A) depend on overall skill
intensity in Southern production h(¯ ap), so that y = A(h(¯ ap))G(¯ ap)f (h(¯ ap)). Then, with
ω∗ > ω, an increase in p would stimulate education and result in a higher skill intensity
of Southern production. This leads to a higher TFP level and therefore counteracts the
negative income eﬀects described in Proposition 1. Depending on the strength of this
externality it cannot be generally excluded that a higher emigration rate makes the left-
behind population better oﬀ. However, in the empirically relevant case with ω∗ < ω, the
welfare loss materializes a fortiori.
To conclude, this note argues that labor market integration is likely to hurt non-
migrants in poor countries and, to the extent that rich destination countries are relatively
8In the presence of migration, the Southern policy makers may want to cut back on D. This incentive
is taken into account in Egger et al. (2007).
8egalitarian, it tends to raise inequality in source countries.
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In sections 2 and 3, we have studied the implications of a non-discriminatory migration
lottery. In this section, we will brieﬂy discuss the consequences of “quality-selective”
migration policies, by assuming pH > pL = 0. For the purpose of tractability, we consider
a Cobb-Douglas production technology: Y = G(¯ a)hα
E, with hE ≡ (1 − pH)h(¯ a) and
α ∈ (0,1). Then the following Proposition can be formulated.
Proposition 3. Under a Cobb-Douglas production technology, introduction of a quality-
selective migration policy (with pH > pL = 0) reduces cutoﬀ ability ¯ a, GDP per capita y
and total income of non-migrants in the Southern economy.
Proof. A formal proof of Proposition 3 is presented below.
If the North introduces a quality-selective migration policy, high-skilled workers face
an emigration probability pH > 0, while all low-skilled workers remain immobile. All other
things equal, this raises the expected skill premium per eﬃciency unit ωe (as w∗
H > wH
has been assumed) and therefore provides additional incentives for acquiring education.
As a consequence, cutoﬀ ability ¯ a declines. Similar to the baseline scenario with identical
emigration probabilities across skill groups, a positive emigration probability, pH > 0,
drives a wedge between the ex ante education incentives of potential emigrants and the
ex post skill-intensity which would be optimal for non-migrants. This reduces GDP per
capita and total income of non-migrants.
While it is unambiguous that the overall impact of a quality selective migration lottery
on non-migrants is negative, its distributional consequences are less clear. This has the
following reason. In the case of a Cobb-Douglas production technology, the skill premium
is given by ω = [α/(1−α)][(1−pH)h(¯ a)]−1. Noting h0(¯ a) < 0, according to (2), there are
two counteracting eﬀects of a marginal pH increase on skill premium ω. On the one hand,
for a given ¯ a, the outﬂow of high-skilled workers reduces the skill intensity of Southern
production and therefore raises the skill premium. On the other hand, a decline in the
10cutoﬀ ability level implies that more people acquire education, so that high-skilled labor
becomes a less scarce resource. For a given pH this leads to a lower skill premium. It is
in general not clear, which of the two eﬀects dominates. However, it is intuitive that the
second eﬀect is stronger if the elasticity of labor supply with respect to cutoﬀ ability ¯ a is
suﬃciently high. As the impact of a pH increase on the skill premium per eﬃciency unit
turns out to be ambiguous, it is not surprising that its impact on relative factor return Ω
is ambiguous, as well. The compositional eﬀect, however, reinforces the indirect negative
eﬀect on ω, so that a decline in the skill premium is suﬃcient for a decline in relative
factor return Ω.
Proof of Proposition 3
Consider pH > pL = 0 and f(hE) = hα






H + (1 − pH)αhα−1
E
− ¯ a, (S1)




∂Γ/∂hE × (1 − pH)dh(¯ a)/d¯ a − 1
∂Γ/∂pH − ∂Γ/∂hE × h(¯ a)
. (S2)
Noting ∂Γ/∂hE > 0, ∂Γ/∂pH < 0 (due to w∗
H > wH) and h0(¯ a) < 0 (from (2)), proves
d¯ a/dpH < 0.
Let us next consider the impact of pH on GDP per capita. For his purpose, we consider
y =
G(¯ a)[(1 − pH)h(¯ a)]α
1 − pH(1 − G(¯ a))
≡ ˜ y(¯ a,pH). (S3)





G(¯ a)[1 − pH(1 − G(¯ a))]
, (S4)
with g(a) = dG(a)/da and
ξ(¯ a,pH) ≡ (1 − pH) − α[1 − pH(1 − G(¯ a))]
h(¯ a) + ¯ a
h(¯ a)
. (S5)
11Noting lim¯ a→0+ ξ(·) = (1 − α)(1 − pH), lim¯ a→1− ξ(·) = −∞ and ∂ξ/∂¯ a < 0, it is obvious
that, for any pH ∈ [0,1), there exists a unique ¯ a∗(pH) ∈ (0,1) that maximizes ˜ y(·).




(1 − G(¯ a))yψ(¯ a,pH)
(1 − pH)[1 − pH(1 − G(¯ a))]
, (S6)
with
ψ(¯ a,pH) ≡ (1 − pH) − α[1 − pH(1 − G(¯ a))]
1
1 − G(¯ a)
. (S7)
Comparing (S5) and (S7), we see that
ξ(·) >,=,< ψ(·) ⇐⇒ G(¯ a)h(¯ a) >,=,< (1 − G(¯ a))¯ a. (S8)
Noting G(¯ a)h(¯ a) − (1 − G(¯ a))¯ a =
R 1
¯ a (a − ¯ a)dG(¯ a) > 0, according to (2), we can therefore
conclude that ξ(·) > ψ(·). This, however, implies that ∂˜ y/∂pH|¯ a=¯ a∗ < 0. Consider a
lottery with p0
H ∈ (0,1) (and pL = 0) and denote by ¯ a0 the respective cutoﬀ ability
level under decentralized education decisions. Then, it follows from eqs. (S4) and (S5)
that there exists a ¯ a∗(p0
H) ∈ (0,1) which leads to ˜ y(¯ a∗,p0
H) ≥ ˜ y(¯ a0,p0
H) – where a strict
inequality holds if ¯ a∗ 6= ¯ a0. Furthermore, it follows from eqs. (S6)-(S8) that there exists
a p1
H < p0
H, such that ˜ y(¯ a∗,p1
H) > ˜ y(¯ a∗,p0
H). Noting that ¯ a∗ = ¯ a0 if p0
H = 0, this proves
that introduction of a quality-selective migration lottery with pH > pL = 0 reduces GDP
per capita in the Southern economy.9
In a ﬁnal step, we have to show that a quality-selective migration lottery with pH >
pL = 0 lowers total income of Southern non-migrants. We use indices 1 and 0 to refer to











1) denotes wage payments to workers who emigrate after introduction of a quality-
selective migration lottery. Finally, total wage income of non-migrants after introduction
9Evaluating (S1) at pH = 0 gives ¯ a = [(1 − α)/α]h(¯ a). Furthermore, substituting (S5) into (S4) end
evaluating the resulting expression at pH = 0 gives ∂˜ y(·)/∂¯ a = G
0(¯ a)f(h(¯ a))[(1 − α) − α¯ a/h(¯ a)]. This
proves that the decentralized education decisions maximize GDP per capita if pH = 0, implying ¯ a
∗ = ¯ a0
in this case.




1. Hence, the introduction of a





































Let us consider the sign of T1 ﬁrst. From (S10), it follows that



















Noting f0(hE) = αhα−1
E = wH, f(hE) − f0(hE)hE = (1 − α)hα
E = wL and hE = (1 −




L) = α/(1 − α). This implies T1 >,=,< 0
⇔ αw0
H/w1
H + (1 − α)w0
L/w1









E)α and using η ≡ h0
E/h1
E, we can therefore conclude:
T1 >,=,< 0 ⇐⇒ ηα 
αη−1 + (1 − α)

>,=,< 1. (S11)
Diﬀerentiating ζ(η) ≡ ηα 
αη−1 + (1 − α)

, we see that ζ0(η) < 0 if η ∈ (0,1), while
ζ0(η) > 0 if η > 1. Put diﬀerently, ζ(η) has a minimum at η = 1. According to (S11), this
implies T1 ≥ 0 (with a strict inequality if η 6= 1).










L = ¯ a0w0
H from (1), we obtain T2 = (1 − p)w0
H
R ¯ a0
¯ a1 (¯ a0 − a)dG(a), which
is strictly positive as ¯ a0 > ¯ a1 if pH > pL = 0 and w∗
H > max(w0
H,w1
H) (see above). As a
consequence, we have T1 + T2 > 0, so that non-migrants are worse oﬀ after introduction
of a quality-selective migration lottery. This completes the proof of Proposition 3. QED.
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